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POSTSCRIPT
Right of Privacy
In a note appearing in a recent issue of
THE CATHOLIC LAWYER,1 there was a dis-
cussion of the inroads made upon the law
of defamation by use of the first amend-
ment. The note dealt primarily with the
extension of the privilege of free com-
ment resulting from the landmark case of
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan2 where-
in the United States Supreme Court held
that:
constitutional guarantees require . . . a
federal rule that prohibits a public official
from recovering damages for a defamatory
falsehood relating to his official conduct
unless he proves that the statement was
made with 'actual malice' - that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reck-
less disregard of whether it was false or
not.3
Also discussed was Time, Inc. v. Hill,4 a
case concerning the first amendment and
the tort of invasion of privacy.
'Note, 12 CATHOLIC LAW. 235 (1966).
2 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
1 ld. at 279-80. (Emphasis added.)
4382 U.S. 936 (1965).
In Hill, plaintiff and his family had
been the subject of intense publicity as a
result of their having been held captive
by three escaped convicts. Subsequently,
a book, play and motion picture ap-
peared which were inspired by, but
which were materially different from,
plaintiff's experiences. Life magazine, pub-
lished by defendant, represented the play
as a true-to-life re-enactment of what had
transpired. The New York appellate di-
vision held that by portraying for trade
purposes, as true, the fictionalized ac-
count of plaintiff's experiences, the de-
fendant had violated New York's privacy
law.' The New York Court of Appeals
affirmed without opinion.6 On appeal, the
United States Supreme Court rendered no
decision, but asked for reargument on a
number of questions, including
[whether] the concept of 'fictionalization'
as used in the charge [to the jury] . . .
require[s] intentional fabrication, or reck-
less disregard of the truth or falsity of
5 Hill v. Hayes, 18 App. Div. 2d 485, 240
N.Y.S.2d 286 (1st Dep't 1963).
6Hill v. Hayes, 15 N.Y.2d 986, 207 N.E.2d
604, 260 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1965).
statements of fact, as a condition of
liability? 7
On reargument, the Supreme Court held
that
the constitutional protections for speech
and press preclude the application of the
New York statute to redress false reports
of matters of public interest in the
absence of proof that the defendant pub-
lished the report with knowledge of its
falsity or in reckless disregard of the
truth.$
It is the purpose of this postscript to ex-
amine the Hill case, and to consider its
ramifications in the area of free speech
and press.
Under Sections 50 and 51 of the New
York Civil Rights Law,9 an individual is
allowed redress for the unauthorized use
of his name, portrait or picture for ad-
vertising or trade purposes. However,
since promotion of the dissemination of
news has been deemed in the public
interest, the factual reporting of news-
worthy persons and events has been held
not to be prohibited by these sections."
7Time, Inc. v. Hill, 382 U.S. 936 (1965).
8Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88
(1967).
9 N.Y. Civ. RiGHTS LAw §§ 50-51. Section 50
states: "A person, firm or corporation that uses
for advertising purposes, or for the purposes
of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any
living person without having first obtained the
written consent of such person . . . is guilty of
a misdemeanor." Section 51 states: "Any
person whose name, portrait or picture is
used . . . for advertising purposes or for the
purposes of trade without the written consent
. . . first obtained . . . may maintain an
equitable action . . . to . . . restrain the use
thereof; and may also sue and recover dam-
ages .
10 Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d
324, 328, 221 N.E.2d 543, 544-45, 274 N.Y.S.2d
877, 879 (1966).
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Prior to Hill, the protection afforded
newsworthy items did not apply where the
items were fictionalized.'" However, un-
der the present holding, in order for a
fictionalization of a newsworthy report
to be actionable, the plaintiff must satis-
fy the standard of Times v. Sullivan-
a showing of actual malice. But the
Court specifically stated that it arrived at
its decision to use this standard, "not
through blind application" of the hold-
ing of Times v. Sullivan, but only
upon consideration of the factors which
arise in the particular context of the ap-
plication of the New York statute in cases
involving private individuals.12
Therefore, it discouraged any attempt to
distinguish the two cases.1
3
The Court in Hill took great care to
limit the area in which its decision would
apply. It expressly stated that it was not
deciding any constitutional questions which
might arise in defamation actions where
the plaintiff is other than a public of-
ficial. 14  It addition, the Court reasoned
that the standard used in Times v. Sul-
livan, where a public official was suing
in defamation, and the standard used
in the instant case, where a party, not a
public official, was suing for violation of
the right of privacy, was not necessarily
the same standard which would be applied
if a public official was suing for violation
of the right of privacy. The Court made
it Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 278 App. Div.
431, 434, 106 N.Y.S.2d 553, 556 (lst Dep't
1951), ajf'd, 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485
(1952).
12 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 390
(1967).
13 Ibid.
14Id. at 385, n. 9.
RECENT DECISIONS
it clear that this question was not before
it, but seemed to indicate that the public
official in the area of the right of privacy
would be in a special category, much as
he is in the area of defamation. 15
The defendant in Hill argued that the
New York statute was unconstitutional on
its face since the courts of that state were
not applying the proper constitutional
standards. The Court, however, rejected
this argument, expressing its confidence
that the New York courts would, in the
future, apply the statute in light of these
constitutional commands. 16
An aspect of the Hill decision which
will probably be the subject of much
future litigation is the concept of "public
interest." This term was not defined
in Hill, the Court there stating that plain-
tiff's experiences were undoubtedly in the
"public interest." '1  However, while it
may be clear at times that a specific event
either is, or is not, in the public interest,
there are many cases imaginable where
the answer is not so obvious. Therefore,
the question which will have to be an-
swered is, at what point does private
matter become public.
In this area of first amendment free-
doms, it is interesting to note the inter-
play between violations of the right of
privacy and defamations. In the case
of defamation, redress is sought because
of the injury to reputation caused by the
false statements. In privacy actions, re-
dress is sought for the mental distress
resulting from exposure to public view.
However, there are times when one state-
ment is a violation of both rights and,
1 Id. at 391.
16 Id. at 397.
17 Id. at 388.
therefore, a cause of action may be
predicated upon either tort. If in such
a case, a cause of action by a person
not a public official, for a violation of his
right of privacy would not lie because
the constitutional standard of actual mal-
ice was not met, it would seem likely
that this same constitutional standard
might also preclude the cause of action
in defamation. However, since the Court
limited its holding to right of privacy
cases, this question also will have to be
decided.
Another question left unanswered by
the Court concerns the standard to be
applied if a public official seeks redress
for violation of his right of privacy. The
Supreme Court has indicated that the
constitution exacts a special hardiness from
these individuals who voluntarily enter the
public arena. Since Tines v. Sullivan
renders privileged any defamatory state-
ments about public officials made without
actual malice, it would seem that state-
ments which violate a public official's right
of privacy should also be privileged.
Therefore, it would seem that in order
to recover under the right of privacy
statutes, a public official at least will have
to prove actual malice-the same stan-
dard used in both a defamation action by
a public official and a right of privacy
action by a person of "public interest,"
but not a public official. However, con-
sidering the nature of a right of privacy
action, which seeks damages for ex-
posure to public view, and considering the
relevance which almost every detail of
the private life of a public official has on
the public's judgment of his qualifications
for office, it seems to follow that a public
official who has chosen to put himself
before the public eye would be subject
to even a greater privilege, perhaps even
an absolute one, protecting statements
about him which might otherwise violate
his right of privacy. Thus, even on a
showing of actual malice, no redress would
be afforded a public official in a right of
privacy action.
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As noted, many questions concerning
defamation and privacy actions remain
unanswered. Answers will come; Time,
Inc. v. Hill is but one of the building
blocks as the Supreme Court measures the
communication torts by the guarantees of
the first amendment.
DEFINING OBSCENITY
(Continued)
be debated. Presently, the Wisconsin
Statutes uses "lewd, obscene and in-
decent" without defining them, leaving the
definition to the courts. By its decision
in State v. Chobot, 12 Wis. 2d 110
(1960) and McCauley v. Tropic of Can-
cer, 20 Wis. 2d 132 (1963), the Wis-
consin Supreme Court has defined the
statutory term "obscenity" as equivalent
to the Roth definition and has required
the Roth standard for judging materials
obscene. Thus, obscenity is defined in
ST. THOMAS MORE
(Continued)
tyranny, More said: "You must pardon
me from passing as you pass, but if I
thought in the matter as you do, I dare
not in such a matter pass for good com-
pany. For the passage of my soul passes
accordance with the United States
Supreme Court's view of a constitutional
definition.
The prevailing view of the United
States Supreme Court is based on the
Roth decision. The present majority
interpretation is that the Roth standard
includes 3 specifications: 1) the dom-
inant theme on the whole appeals to the
prurient interest, 2) it is patently offen-
sive to present community standards, and
3) it contains no redeeming social value.
all good company."
In the final analysis, More is the con-
temporary man because he is the type of
man we need. A man willing to make
his own frightening judgments. A man.
